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NO REST FOR THE WEARY: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
IMPLICATIONS OF VACATING A DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA 
Andrew Cassady∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If Pedro Cabrera would have just kept his mouth shut, he would be a 
free man today.  In March of 2004, the State of Illinois offered 
defendant Pedro Cabrera six years’ imprisonment in exchange for his 
plea of guilty to one count of armed robbery.1  After the typical Rule 11 
colloquy,2 Judge Leo Holt entered his findings regarding Cabrera’s 
guilty plea: “Let the record reflect that there is a sufficient basis for the 
plea of guilty.  Accordingly the plea of guilty is accepted.  There will be 
a finding of guilty.  Judgment is entered on the finding.”3  During 
sentencing, the State informed the court that Cabrera had four prior 
felony convictions, prompting Judge Holt to question Cabrera about his 
criminal record when given the opportunity to address the court.4  After 
a brief exchange in which the court expressed its disbelief as to the mere 
six-year sentence for this now five-time convicted felon, one slip of the 
tongue would cost Cabrera an additional fourteen years in prison: 
I hate to tell you the truth, Your Honor, you know what I’m saying, I pled 
guilty because of my background.  I can’t show my innocence.  That’s the 
only thing wrong with my life.  Can’t show my innocence because of my 
background.5 
In a stunning turn of events, Judge Holt vacated Cabrera’s guilty plea 
and forced him to stand trial despite the defendant’s avid protests.6  
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Illinois v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010).  Cabrera accepted the deal, and 
the State nol-prossed the remaining charges of the indictment.  Cabrera was originally indicted on two 
counts of armed robbery, two counts of burglary, and two counts of aggravated unlawful restraint 
involving an encounter with a husband and wife and their two children as they were exiting their car.  
Id.  The term nol-pros stems from the Latin nolle prosequi, and it refers to a situation where a prosecutor 
drops a criminal charge against a defendant either before trial or before a verdict is rendered.  “Nolle 
prosequi” MERRIAM–WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2012), http://www.merriam-webster.com/. 
 2. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a court to, inter alia, determine 
that a defendant’s guilty plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for such plea before the court 
accepts it.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  In this case, Judge Holt found that Cabrera voluntarily plead guilty, 
while the State’s factual basis for Cabrera’s guilty plea was stipulated to by the defense. Cabrera, 932 
N.E. 2d at 533. 
 3. Id. at 533. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  The following is the entire exchange between Judge Holt and Cabrera.  I include the 
entire excerpt because of how crucial it was to this particular case, and how meaningful it is to the 
broader topic of Double Jeopardy: 
1
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Cabrera eventually chose to have a bench trial, where he was found 
guilty of all counts of the original indictment, including the armed 
robbery charge to which he pled guilty, and was sentenced to a 
staggering twenty-year prison term by none other than Judge Holt.7 
Cabrera appealed, alleging that Judge Holt exposed him to double 
jeopardy by sua sponte vacating his guilty plea and setting his case for 
trial on all charges after accepting his plea of guilty to the count of 
armed robbery and granting the State’s motion to nol-pros the remaining 
charges.8  This Note specifically addresses the double jeopardy 
implications of vacating the defendant’s guilty plea to the count of 
armed robbery, only to force him to stand trial on that very same 
charge.9  Part II of this Note provides an introduction to the Double 
 
THE COURT: Mr. Cabrera, you can’t imagine how lucky you are.  I don’t even 
understand the sentence and the agreement that was made between your attorney and the 
state’s attorney.  It boggles my mind that you are a five time convicted felon and you 
committed an armed robbery which endangers the life of the people that you were 
robbing and you come out with a six year sentence.  It just boggles my mind that you 
come out with the minimum.  I don’t understand it. 
THE DEFENDANT: I hate to tell you the truth, Your Honor, you know what I’m saying, 
I plead guilty because of my background.  I can’t show my innocence.  That’s the only 
thing wrong with my life.  Can’t show my innocence because of my background. 
THE COURT: Are you telling me that you are innocent of this charge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well Mr. Cabrera, you’re going to get a chance to prove your innocence.  
I don’t take guilty pleas from people who are innocent of the crimes that they are 
charged with. 
THE DEFENDANT: But Your Honor, I prefer to take the time, sir. 
THE COURT: I’m not interested in what you prefer.  You don’t have a right to cause me 
to disgrace myself and the criminal justice system by accepting a plea of guilty from you 
when you are in fact not guilty.  That’s what you are telling me, that you didn’t commit 
this crime.  I’m not going to send you to the penitentiary for a crime you didn’t commit.  
Just because that may be your desire.  You don’t have a right to impose that on me. 
THE DEFENDANT: Sir, I no I’m standing—I can’t beat it at trial, sir. 
THE COURT: I don’t care whether you can beat it or not.  You’re entitled to a trial if 
you are not guilty of the crime you are charged with. 
THE DEFENDANT: I been blessed already, you known what I’m saying.  I’ve been 
blessed in the courtroom already. 
THE COURT: You’re going to be blessed again because you’re going to get a trial.  Set 
this case for trial.  The plea is ordered vacated.  Waiving his right to trial by jury.  The 
previous order vacating his-waiving his right to trial by jury is vacated.  The plea of not 
guilty is reinstated. 
Id. 
 7. Id. at 534.  The twenty-year sentence included the one count of armed robbery to which 
Cabrera had pled guilty.  Judge Holt also imposed a concurrent seven-year prison term for burglary.  Id. 
 8. Id. at 534–35.  The defendant also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.  The decision to 
nol-pros a certain charge may be made because the charges cannot be proved due to lack of evidence, 
because the evidence is flawed in light of the claims brought or may be made if the prosecutor becomes 
doubtful the accused is guilty; whatever the exact reason for the nolle prosequi, the decision to move for 
one lies solely in the prosecutor’s discretion.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 215 (1967). 
 9. This Note will not address the double jeopardy implications of convicting the defendant on 
2
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Jeopardy Clause and then analyzes two competing lines of cases that 
examine the double jeopardy implications of vacating a defendant’s 
guilty plea and forcing him to stand trial.  Part III discusses the Illinois 
Appellate Court’s decision in Cabrera, while Part IV comments on the 
merits of that decision and the more general circuit split.  Finally, Part V 
concludes that a defendant’s double jeopardy protection is violated in 
this context and suggests that the Supreme Court should enumerate a 
clear standard. 
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY LITERATURE 
This Part provides a brief background to the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
specifically in the context of guilty pleas, and then traces two lines of 
cases which offer differing opinions on whether or not the sua sponte 
vacation of a defendant’s guilty plea and subsequent enforcement of trial 
violates the United States Constitution. 
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause and Guilty Pleas 
Rooted in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause provides, “nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”10  Jeopardy 
simply means exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or 
innocence,11 and thus this provision affords a defendant three basic 
safeguards: it protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction; and protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.12  Although the precise origins of 
 
the charges that were nol-prossed, since that topic has been addressed by the Supreme Court and much 
has been written about it.  See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) (where a defendant pleads guilty to 
only some of the charges and pleads not guilty to the more serious charges, the pleas of guilty to not 
resolve all charges brought by the State and the principles of finality are not implicated to bar 
prosecution on the remaining charges based on double jeopardy).  But see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 
(1977) (prohibiting the prosecution of a defendant for auto theft and joyriding after the defendant had 
already pled guilty to joyriding stemming from the same incident and spent thirty days in jail); see also 
Daniel Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181, 1193 n.38 (1996) 
(explaining that jeopardy does not attach to dismissed charges); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and 
Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L. J. 351, 354 (2005) (“American jurisdictions recognize 
lesser included offenses as a device that permits a jury to acquit a defendant of a charged offense and 
instead to convict of a less serious crime that is necessarily committed during the commission of the 
charged offense.”). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 11. United States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
 12. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498. 
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the guarantee against double jeopardy are uncertain,13 it is indeed a 
storied and fundamental right.14  These protections not only seek to 
achieve the goals of finality and repose for the defendant, but also 
guard against prosecutorial overreaching: 
The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
he may be found guilty.15 
Although these underlying principles have been applied in both jury trial 
and guilty plea proceedings, the respective double jeopardy implications 
of both situations have not directly mirrored each other.16  Because the 
double jeopardy ramifications of a jury verdict may differ from those of 
a guilty plea, a few concepts arise in this latter context that are important 
to understanding the issue at hand.  First, if a defendant by his own 
motion causes a guilty plea to be set aside, he waives his constitutional 
protection against being “twice put in jeopardy.”17  Second, the Supreme 
Court has explicated that a guilty plea constitutes a conviction: “A plea 
of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an 
extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction.  Like a verdict of a jury 
it is conclusive.  More is not required; the court has nothing to do but 
give judgment and sentence.”18 
Amidst this backdrop, while it is clear that a defendant “does not have 
an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted 
by the court,”19 once the plea is accepted, the federal circuits are divided 
on whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a court from sua 
 
 13. David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double 
Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 193, 196 (2005). 
 14. Id. at 197 (noting that the protection against double jeopardy can be traced all the way back 
to the Old Testament); Bartkus v. Illionis, 359 U.S. 121, 151–52 (1929) (Black, J. dissenting) (“Fear and 
abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas 
found in western civilization.”); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 786 (1969) (“The fundamental 
nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted.”). 
 15. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 16. See Sally C. Quillan, Ohio v. Johnson: Prohibiting the Offensive Use of Guilty Pleas to 
Invoke Double Jeopardy Protection, 19 GA. L. REV. 159, 172–73 (1984). 
 17. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3rd Cir. 1973 ); accord United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (reasoning that the constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit is 
not offended where the defendant has requested that the court remove him from the jeopardy of the 
guilty plea). 
 18. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); accord Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 242 (1969). 
 19. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). 
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sponte vacating the plea and proceeding to trial.20 
B. Circuits Finding No Double Jeopardy Violation 
Some courts have found a trial judge’s decision to sua sponte vacate a 
defendant’s guilty plea and force him to stand trial perfectly within the 
confines of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as evident in Gilmore v. 
Zimmerman.21  Although the defendant there stated that he had no 
recollection of killing his wife, he nonetheless pled guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter because his counsel advised that it would be in his best 
interests to do so.22  After the judge told the defendant that the court was 
not bound by the plea agreement, the judge ended the Rule 11 colloquy 
by asserting, “I will allow the guilty plea to be entered.”23  At the 
sentencing proceeding, the court gave the defendant the decision to 
either stand on his plea (and thus be subjected to the judge’s sentence) 
or withdraw his plea and stand trial.24  The defendant chose the former, 
but after his attorney dodged a question from the court, the judge, over 
the defense’s objections, said, “the guilty plea is struck off.  A not guilty 
plea is entered for the defendant, and he will stand trial.”25  In finding no 
 
 20. This wide, well-established circuit split was actually identified in Cabrera v. Acevedo, No. 
11-C-1390, slip. Op. at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2012), which was Pedro Cabrera’s habeas case.  That 
court’s opinion, though it did identify the circuit split, was altogether unhelpful in resolving the question 
at hand; it merely opined that until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, the defendant could not meet 
the stringent habeas standards under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006). 
 21. 793 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
 22. Id. at 566. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 567.  The prosecutor offered a five-year prison sentence, opining that it would be 
unable to obtain a jury verdict higher than involuntary manslaughter.  Id. 
 25. Id.  The judge vacated the guilty plea because he found an inadequate factual basis to support 
the defendant’s equivocal guilty plea.  Similar to the Cabrera case, the entire colloquy is important for 
fully understanding the context of the court’s decision: 
THE COURT: Dr. Gilmore, Trooper Pease has stated in his report that you admitted to 
him that you gave your wife vitamin B-12 and meperidine.  Do you recall making that 
statement to him, or do you deny making it to him, or do you admit making it to him? 
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I have advised Dr. 
Gilmore that in line with the plea as we have entered it, I don’t think that those matters 
are relevant at this time.  We have entered a plea on the record.  We have stated our 
position on the record, and I do not believe that it’s appropriate to develop into anything 
else other than what is pertinent at this time, which is the sentence. 
THE COURT: Well, then that makes it very easy . . . .  Then in accordance with Rule 
320 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the guilty plea is struck off.  A not guilty plea is 
entered for the defendant, and he will stand trial.  Trial is fixed for March the 21st, 1983. 
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: If it please the Court, before the Court proceeds, I’d like to 
know why the Court is taking the position that he’s taking, and I would like to confer 
with Dr. Gilmore.  I’ve merely stated my position.  THAT DOESN’T MEAN THAT HE 
WOULD NOT RESPOND.* 
THE COURT: . . . there are too many unanswered questions in this whole matter, and 
therefore, I think the appropriate procedure is that the matter go to trial, and that’s why I 
5
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double jeopardy violation, the Third Circuit opined that since the 
defendant pled guilty to a lesser included offense while a more serious 
charge remained pending, the fact that his plea was stricken put him in 
no better position than that of a defendant whose plea remained intact, 
and added that the defendant’s prosecution would “at most result in only 
one” conviction.26 
The First Circuit in United States v. Santiago Soto similarly found the 
trial court’s sua sponte vacation of a defendant’s guilty plea and 
subsequent mandate of trial constitutionally permissible.27  The Santiago 
court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense 
stemming from his removal and opening of mail addressed to someone 
else.28  After the defendant asserted, in mitigation, “I am paying the 
restitution for the things that I have not done,” the court sua sponte 
vacated his guilty plea and dismissed the case.29  Although the 
government objected, the defendant did not.30  A few months later, 
however, a grand jury indicted the defendant with the felonies of 
obstruction of correspondence and theft of mail matter, and a jury 
subsequently found him guilty.31  In finding no double jeopardy 
violation, the First Circuit stressed that jeopardy attaches only at “the 
point at which the risks of injury are so great that the government should 
have to shoulder the heavy burden of showing manifest necessity for 
repetitious proceedings.”32  The court proffered, “the mere acceptance of 
a guilty plea does not carry the same expectation of finality and 
tranquility that comes with a jury’s verdict,” and concluded that when 
the judge accepted the guilty plea but then soon rejected it in the same 
proceeding, the defendant was not placed in jeopardy in any meaningful 
sense.33 
 
struck the guilty plea. 
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor— 
THE COURT: Court is adjourned. 
Id. 
 26. Id. at 570.  The court added that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against successive 
prosecutions for the same offense was not implicated in the situation before it.  Id. 
 27. 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 28. Id. at 617.  Although a Postal Service inspector presented a complaint accusing the defendant 
of two felonies, the United States merely decided to charge him with a misdemeanor.  Id. 
 29. Id.  The court proffered, “how are we going to find this man guilty and condemn him when 
he says he did not do it?”  Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 618.  Unlike the case before it, where the trial court unconditionally accepted the 
defendant’s guilty plea, the court noted that some circuits hold that jeopardy does not attach when the 
trial court only conditionally accepts the plea.  Id.; see also United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 763 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
 33. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d at 620. 
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Following suit, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Kim found no 
double jeopardy violation after the district court vacated the defendant’s 
guilty plea and forced him to stand trial.34  The defendant there pled 
guilty to one of the three counts of tax evasion in exchange for the 
dismissal of the other charges.35  The court ensured that the defendant 
voluntarily pled guilty.36  After the defendant presented evidence at 
sentencing to prove that he lacked the requisite willfulness for the crime, 
however, the court granted the government’s motion to withdraw the 
plea, holding that the defendant had rejected the plea agreement by 
taking a position that undermined the factual basis for his guilty plea.37  
While the court noted that jeopardy attaches with the acceptance of a 
guilty plea, it stressed that attachment alone does not settle the issue, 
opining that when a defendant repudiates the plea bargain, there are no 
double jeopardy ramifications.38 
C. Circuits Finding a Double Jeopardy Violation 
Other courts, such as the First Circuit in United States v. Cruz, 39 have 
found that the sua sponte vacation of a defendant’s guilty plea and 
ensuing prosecution of that defendant at trial does indeed violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Cruz defendant was indicted under a 
felony drug charge, but pursuant to a subsequent plea agreement with 
the government, he pled guilty to a mere misdemeanor.40  After strictly 
following the Rule 11 protocol, the district court judge declared, “I will 
accept the [guilty plea] . . . and a judgment of guilty would be 
entered . . . .”41  At the sentencing proceeding, however, the court 
rejected the plea bargain on the basis that the presentence report 
indicated that the defendant had more involvement in the crime than he 
had initially stated.42  On appeal, the First Circuit acknowledged that 
many circuits hold that jeopardy attaches upon the court’s acceptance of 
a guilty plea,43 and noted that “once the court accepted the 
 
 34. 884 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 35. Id. at 191. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 40. Id. at 111–12.  The defendant had three co-defendants, two of whom also pleaded guilty.  Id. 
 41. Id. at 112. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 113; see United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d at 762; United States v. Cambindo 
Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(asserting that the defendant “must be considered to have been convicted by the entry of his plea of 
guilty just as if a jury had found a verdict of guilty against him”); United States v. Dawson, 77 F.3d 180, 
182 (7th Cir. 1996). 
7
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agreement . . . it could not simply change its mind” later.44  The court 
qualified this statement, however, by providing that jeopardy need not 
attach automatically in all instances when a guilty plea is accepted,45 
and the court specifically noted that the defendant was never in jeopardy 
of conviction on any charge except the lesser offense to which his plea 
was offered.46  Nonetheless, the First Circuit held that jeopardy attached 
when the defendant’s plea was accepted since the district court’s actions 
undermined the protection afforded the defendant by the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure: “Rule 11 appears to speak unequivocally; if the 
plea is accepted . . . the mere postponement of sentencing itself to a 
future date does not authorize the judge to remake or vacate the plea 
bargain for whatever reasons later seem appropriate to her.”47 
Likewise, in Morris v. Reynolds,48 the Second Circuit found a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Although the defendant in that 
case pled guilty to a misdemeanor after the greater felony offense was 
dismissed,49 the district court reinstated the felony charge several 
months later when preparing for sentencing.50  In attempting to balance 
both “the defendant’s interest in finality and the state’s interest in having 
one full and fair opportunity to convict,”51 the court sided with the 
defendant since the felony offense was not pending at the time the plea 
was accepted.52  Thus, the Second Circuit held that, “the double 
jeopardy bar arises, after a conviction but before sentencing, when a 
defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included offense, the prosecution did 
not object to the plea, and there was no greater offense pending at the 
time the plea was accepted.”53  Citing to the Supreme Court, the Second 
Circuit highlighted the fact that a guilty plea constitutes a conviction: “a 
guilty plea is . . . itself a conviction.  Like a verdict of a jury it is 
 
 44. Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114–15. 
 45. Id. at 114 (noting that “acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense carries no implied 
acquittal of the greater offense and for this reason is not the same as a verdict.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 115; accord United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 48. 264 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 49. Id. at 42.  The misdemeanor was Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, 
while the felony was Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree.  The latter was dismissed 
by the court for insufficiency of evidence.  There was some ambiguity as to whether the trial judge 
reinstated the felony count before the defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor, but the Court of 
Appeals resolved that ambiguity in favor of the defendant.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 43. 
 51. Id. at 44. 
 52. Id. at 50.  The Court distinguished the facts at hand from Ohio v. Johnson by noting that in 
the latter case, the greater included offenses were still pending against the defendant when he pled 
guilty, and added that unlike Johnson, the Morris defendant did not attempt to used double jeopardy “as 
a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining charges.”  Id. at 49–50. 
 53. Id. at 51. 
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conclusive.  More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give 
judgment and sentence.”54  The court thus reasoned that since the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction, the Clause likewise prohibits a second 
prosecution for the same offense following a guilty plea.55 
The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the sua sponte vacation of a 
defendant’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction of that defendant at 
trial violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.56  The defendant in United 
States v. Patterson pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana, but since the 
number of marijuana plants was in dispute, the plea agreement stated 
that the number of plants would be litigated at sentencing.57  While the 
district court accepted the plea, it retained discretion to reject the 
agreement until after it had considered the Presentence Report.58  
Months later, the government successfully argued that the guilty plea 
should be set aside since the defendant was not informed of the number 
of marijuana plants when he pled guilty, prompting the district court to 
vacate the plea and force the defendant to stand trial, where he was 
found guilty.59  In observing that “an accused must suffer jeopardy 
before he can suffer double jeopardy,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
jeopardy attached when the district court accepted the defendant’s plea, 
and as such, “the court did not have the authority to vacate the plea on 
the government’s motion.”60  The court distinguished a guilty plea from 
the plea agreement, asserting that although a district court may reject the 
plea agreement after accepting a guilty plea, it is not free to vacate the 
plea either on the government’s motion or sua sponte; instead, “when 
the court accepts a guilty plea but rejects the plea agreement, it becomes 
the defendant’s choice whether to stand by the plea or to withdraw” it.61  
Because the district court did not have authority to vacate the plea over 
the defendant’s objections, the Ninth Circuit remanded to reinstate his 
original guilty plea and sentence him accordingly.62 
 
 54. Id. at 49. 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 861. 
 58. Id. at 862. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 864. 
 61. Id. at 865; accord United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Vinyard, 539 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing, “the important consideration, for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to 
be followed in the event of prejudicial prosecutorial or judicial error”). 
 62. Patterson, 381 F.3d at 865. 
9
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III. CABRERA V. ACEVEDO 
The Illinois Appellate Court in Cabrera v. Acevedo found no double 
jeopardy violation in Judge Holt’s sua sponte vacation of the 
defendant’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction of him at trial.63  
Writing for the court, Justice Garcia began by highlighting the purposes 
underlying the prohibition against double jeopardy, specifically noting 
that it is “designed to prevent the State from engaging in more than one 
attempt to convict an individual, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense, continuing anxiety and insecurity, and 
increasing the possibility that he may be found guilty even if 
innocent.”64  While the Double Jeopardy Clause furthers the 
constitutional policy in favor of finality for the defendant, the court 
asserted that the double jeopardy analysis should not be applied “if the 
interests the clause seeks to protect are not endangered or where its 
mechanical application would frustrate society’s interest in enforcing 
criminal laws.”65  Justice Garcia’s opinion acknowledged the three 
situations in which jeopardy may attach, specifically conceding that it so 
attaches at a guilty plea hearing when the guilty plea is accepted by the 
trial court.66 
The court first turned its analysis to the defendant’s claims that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the subsequent trial on offenses that the 
State nol-prossed.67  The court explained that whether jeopardy attaches 
to offenses to which no guilty pleas have been entered turns on when the 
State’s motion to nol-pros those charges is entered.68  The court 
concluded that jeopardy attaches at a guilty plea hearing only to those 
offenses to which a defendant actually pleads guilty and only when that 
guilty plea is subsequently accepted by the trial court.69  Relying on 
Ohio v. Johnson,70 the court asserted that “logic dictates that jeopardy 
would attach only to the crime pleaded to since there has been no 
 
 63. People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528, 542 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010). 
 64. Id. at 536. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  Jeopardy may also attach at a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn and at a 
bench trial when the first witness is sworn and the court begins to hear evidence.  Id. at 539. 
 67. Id. at 537. 
 68. Id. 
If the allowance of a motion to nol-pros is entered before the jeopardy attaches, the nolle 
prosequi does not operate as an acquittal, and a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense could legally proceed.  Conversely, the granting of a motion to nol-pros after 
jeopardy attaches has the same effect as an acquittal, and the State may not pursue those 
charges in a subsequent trial. 
Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
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finding of any sort as to the charges nol-prossed.”71 
Justice Garcia’s opinion then delved into a discussion of the double 
jeopardy implications of the trial court’s decision to sua sponte vacate 
Cabrera’s plea of guilty to armed robbery and force him to stand trial on 
that charge.72  While asserting that jeopardy attached to the armed 
robbery charge when the trial court accepted Cabrera’s plea of guilty to 
that count, the court did not find that determinative; rather, “to trigger 
the double jeopardy bar, jeopardy must not only attach, but terminate.”73  
In explaining the concept of “continuing jeopardy,” the court stated, “[a] 
prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the 
same offense, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution: (3) 
Was terminated improperly.”74  Interests supporting the continuing 
jeopardy principle, according to the court, are fairness to society, lack of 
finality, and limited waiver.75  Based on these policy considerations, the 
court equated a guilty plea hearing to a jury trial, opining that “much 
like jeopardy that attaches following the impaneling of a jury . . . which 
‘continues’ throughout the course of trial, the jeopardy that attached 
following Judge Holt’s acceptance of the defendant’s plea of guilty 
continued throughout the course of his guilty plea hearing.”76  Thus, for 
the Cabrera court, just like a proper declaration of a mistrial in the 
course of a trial does not preclude another prosecution, a proper 
termination of a guilty plea hearing did not trigger a double jeopardy bar 
to Cabrera’s prosecution at trial.77 
After a brief discussion of the mechanics of a guilty plea 
proceeding,78 the court observed, “[w]e perceive no constitutional 
distinction between a state practice that bars accepting guilty pleas when 
coupled with protestations of innocence and allowing a circuit court to 
accept or reject such pleas in the exercise of sound judicial discretion.”79  
The court found no reason why Judge Holt’s entry of his finding of 
guilty as to the armed robbery charge precluded him from considering 
Cabrera’s later protestations of innocence: 
 
 71. People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528, 537 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010). 
 72. Id. at 538. 
 73. Id. (citing Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984)). 
 74. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d at 538. 
 75. Id.; accord Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984) (holding that 
“acquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy”). 
 76. Id. at 539. 
 77. Id.  Since the court determined that Judge Holt acted within his discretion in “rejecting the 
defendant’s plea of guilty” there was no double jeopardy violation.  Id. 
 78. The court essentially just noted that a State may bar its courts from accepting equivocal 
guilty pleas and likewise observed that the state has permission to change a plea of guilty to not guilty.  
Id. at 540. 
 79. Id.  The court elaborated at length on why Judge Holt exercised sound discretion, but the gist 
of its reasoning was that Judge Holt had good reason to doubt the truth of Cabrera’s guilty plea. 
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We perceive no reason that the entry of a finding of guilty pursuant to a 
defendant’s plea of guilty is a point beyond which a trial judge must turn 
a deaf ear to a defendant’s protestation of innocence else risk leaving the 
State with no adjudication of the charge should vacating the guilty plea 
trigger double jeopardy.80 
The court further reasoned that because a defendant does not have an 
absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the trial court, the mere 
acceptance of a defendant’s plea of guilty did not terminate the jeopardy 
that attached when the guilty plea was accepted by the trial court.81 
Finally, the Cabrera court justified its holding by concluding that the 
acceptance of a guilty plea is not a conviction, which was important for 
Justice Garcia to emphasize because the Double Jeopardy Clause 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction.82  The court proffered that the mere acceptance of a guilty 
plea is not a conviction because a “sentence is a necessary part of a 
complete judgment of guilt.”83  Thus, because there was no judgment of 
conviction, the jeopardy that attached upon Judge Holt’s acceptance of 
Cabrera’s guilty plea never terminated.84  The court additionally rejected 
any notion that a guilty plea is itself a conviction, reiterating the fact that 
“a guilty plea does not carry the same expectation of finality and 
tranquility that comes with a jury’s verdict . . . .”85 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Perhaps no person better appreciates the axiom, “Think before you 
speak,” than Pedro Cabrera.  To concede that he would have been 
smarter to simply keep his mouth shut does not change the fact that the 
court got it wrong, and the number of circuits that would agree with the 
Illinois Appellate Court86 indicate that these decisions are the product of 
a confused and standard-less precedent in a rare situation not previously 
encountered in many of these circuits.  A court’s sua sponte vacation of 
a defendant’s guilty plea and subsequent enforcement of trial does 
 
 80. Id.  The court quoted United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The 
mere acceptance of a guilty plea does not carry the same expectation of finality and tranquility that 
comes with a jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sentence . . . .”). 
 81. Cabrera, 932 N.E. 2d at 541.  The court dismissed Cabrera’s contention that his subsequent 
conviction at his bench trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments since the bench trial was part of the same continuous prosecution.  The fact that Judge Holt 
imposed a harsher sentence was insufficient to amount to a constitutional violation.  Id. at 542. 
 82. Id. at 541. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 542. 
 86. Id. 
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indeed violate the Fifth Amendment, as such an act runs afoul of 
Supreme Court precedent, ignores the literal language of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, and offends the Fifth Amendment’s underlying 
principles.87 
A Guilty Plea is a Conviction 
The Supreme Court has clearly asserted that a guilty plea is a 
conviction: “A plea of guilty . . . is itself a conviction.  Like a verdict of 
a jury it is conclusive.  More is not required; the court has nothing to do 
but give judgment and sentence.”88  Thus, Cabrera was convicted upon 
the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea.  That he was not sentenced yet 
is irrelevant, for the Supreme Court’s assertion that a guilty plea is a 
conviction and the court has nothing to do but give judgment and 
sentence implies that the imposition of a sentence is not a prerequisite 
for a conviction.89  The Supreme Court has also clearly asserted that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against, inter alia, a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.90  Thus, Cabrera was 
convicted of armed robbery when the court accepted his guilty plea, and 
he was then prosecuted a second time for armed robbery after that 
conviction91 when the court vacated his plea and forced him to stand 
trial.  Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated. 
The Cabrera court was wrong when it said, “[w]e expressly disagree 
with the assertion . . . that a plea of guilty is equivalent to a 
conviction.”92  The rest of the court’s analysis notwithstanding, it simply 
failed to follow binding Supreme Court precedent in that regard.  So too 
was the First Circuit in Santiago-Soto mistaken when it provided, 
“[u]nderlying Johnson is the proposition that an acceptance of a guilty 
plea is legally different from a conviction based on a jury’s verdict.”93  
The Johnson Court merely posited that jeopardy did not attach when the 
trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to a lesser included 
offense while a more serious charge remained pending; it was silent on 
the relationship between being convicted via a guilty plea and being 
convicted pursuant to a jury verdict.94  The actual proposition 
 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 88. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); accord Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 242 (1969). 
 89. See infra Part IV(B)(2). 
 90. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984). 
 91. The Cabrera defendant was also prosecuted for the charges that had been nol-prossed.  932 
N.E. 2d at 534. 
 92. Id. at 542. 
 93. United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 94. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501–02. 
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underlying Johnson was that the acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser 
included offense does not imply an acquittal to the more serious counts 
that remain pending at the time of acceptance.  An implied acquittal is 
irrelevant in the context of prohibiting a “second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction,” as the acceptance of a guilty plea to a 
specific charge constitutes a conviction on that charge, thus barring the 
subsequent prosecution of that charge. 
B. Textualism and the Double Jeopardy Clause 
The acceptance of a guilty plea is a conviction.  The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense 
following a conviction.  Therefore, prosecuting a defendant for a charge 
to which he pled guilty should violate double jeopardy.  Because this 
seems so obvious, why has this situation led to such incongruous 
results?  Many circuits finding no double jeopardy violation in such a 
context maneuver around the “guilty plea as a conviction” principle by 
making much ado about the attachment and termination of a guilty plea.  
In so doing, these courts simply fail to examine the actual language of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,”95 where 
jeopardy is defined as “exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or 
innocence.”96 
Based on the mere meaning of the word “jeopardy,” the oft-cited 
analogy between a jury trial and a guilty plea hearing has been 
misguided to the extent of their respective double jeopardy implications.  
In comparing when jeopardy attaches and terminates in a jury trial 
versus when it attaches and terminates in a guilty plea hearing, both 
sides to this debate have employed faulty reasoning by failing to simply 
read the text of the Fifth Amendment. 
1. Attachment of Jeopardy 
Although at least one circuit has held otherwise,97 the circuits are 
nearly unanimous in holding that jeopardy attaches upon the trial court’s 
 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 96. United States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part).  Merriam–Webster’s Dictionary provides the following synonyms for jeopardy: 
distress, endangerment, harm’s way, imperilment, danger, peril, risk, and trouble.  “Jeopardy.” 
MERRIAM–WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2012), http://www.merriam-webster.com/. 
 97. E.g., United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 618 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that jeopardy 
only attaches at the point at which the risks of injury are so great that the government should have to 
shoulder the heavy burden of showing manifest necessity for repetitious proceedings). 
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acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea98 just as jeopardy attaches when 
a jury is empaneled and sworn in a jury trial or when evidence is first 
produced in the course of a bench trial.99  Despite the lack of 
disagreement among the circuits in this regard, their consensus that 
jeopardy attaches upon the acceptance of a guilty plea runs counter to 
the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  It makes sense to conclude that 
jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled in a jury trial or when the 
first witness is called in a bench trial because, starting from that point, 
the defendant is exposed to the risk of either being found guilty or being 
found innocent.  Because jeopardy attaches when a defendant risks a 
determination of factual guilt, it is nonsensical to hold that jeopardy 
attaches upon the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea because a guilty 
plea is itself a conviction.  At that point, there is no longer any risk of 
being found guilty; rather, at that point, the defendant has been found 
guilty.100  In the context of guilty pleas therefore, jeopardy should attach 
at the inception of the guilty plea hearing.  That is, jeopardy should 
attach when the court is attempting to determine the voluntariness of the 
plea and the factual basis for it, as well as ensuring that the defendant 
understands his rights,101 for it is at that moment that the defendant is 
exposed to the risk of being found guilty.  Just as jeopardy attaches in a 
jury trial long before the jury convicts a defendant by rendering a 
verdict, so too should jeopardy attach before the judge convicts the 
defendant by accepting his plea. 
2. Termination of Jeopardy 
Much more divisive among the circuits is the issue of when jeopardy 
terminates.  Although both attachment and termination of jeopardy were 
required by the Supreme Court in Richardson to trigger double jeopardy 
protection,102 the Court there dealt with a situation in which it 
essentially had to determine if there was even an acquittal or a 
conviction upon which to premise a double jeopardy violation.103  In 
 
 98. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 
761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Dawson, 77 F.3d 180, 182 (7th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 99. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).  Even the Illinois Appellate court 
conceded that jeopardy attached to the armed robbery charge when Judge Holt accepted Cabrera’s guilty 
plea to that count.  People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010). 
 100. See infra Part IV(B)(2). 
 101. This is required by FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 102. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). 
 103. The Court in Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984), provided that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal or conviction. 
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asserting that there must be some event to terminate the original 
jeopardy, the Richardson Court held that the declaration of a mistrial 
following a hung jury was no such event, despite the defendant’s 
contention that the declaration of a mistrial was akin to an acquittal.104  
Thus, the Court invoked the concept of “continuing jeopardy” to hold 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated since the defendant’s 
risk of being found guilty never vanished.  Similarly, the Cabrera court 
noted that jeopardy continues if a conviction is reversed on appeal or if a 
trial ends in a mistrial.105 This makes sense, as the defendant voluntarily 
exposes himself to the risk of an appellate court affirming his conviction 
on appeal, and in a mistrial, the jury usually has not rendered a verdict.  
In other words, the question of guilt or innocence has not been answered 
with finality, and the risk of being found guilty persists.  Unlike 
Richardson and many other cases involving Fifth Amendment claims 
where the “continuing jeopardy” principle is invoked because the risk of 
conviction still exists,106 in Cabrera, the defendant  pled guilty, and, in 
so doing, was convicted.  Not only was there no more jeopardy (because 
there was no more risk of conviction), but by having his guilty plea 
accepted, Cabrera actually foreclosed the possibility that he would be 
spared the risk of conviction. 
While the Supreme Court has asserted that, “[a]cquittals, unlike 
convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy,” the situation before the 
Justices of Boston107 Court was very different from the context of 
vacating a defendant’s guilty plea.  The Court there opined that jeopardy 
should continue when the criminal proceedings against a defendant have 
not run their full course, and thus, because the defendant requested a 
new trial after being convicted, the second proceeding did not amount to 
double jeopardy.108  In fact, the Court noted that the second proceeding 
actually afforded the defendant more protection than is given to most 
people in his position.109  In Cabrera, the defendant was not appealing 
 
 104. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). 
 105. People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010).  The court there also noted that 
jeopardy may continue where a judge terminates a guilty plea hearing properly.  Id. at 539. 
 106. See infra Part IV(C). 
 107. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984). 
 108. Id. at 308. 
 109. Id.  The Court explained why double jeopardy is not implicated when a defendant appeals his 
conviction: 
While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of 
greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball 
principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.  
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in 
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial.  It would be a high 
price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment 
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/7
2013] COMMENT—VACATING A DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA 1555 
his conviction; he was not availing himself of another trial; he was not 
exposing himself to the risk of being convicted.  Rather, he was trying to 
merely stand on his conviction.  In noting that convictions do not 
terminate the initial jeopardy, the Justices of Boston Court was faced 
with a situation in which the defendant was trying to use jeopardy as a 
sword to claim that he should not be twice-exposed to the risk of being 
found guilty despite the fact that he voluntarily exposed himself to that 
risk.  The reasoning behind the blanket statement that “convictions do 
not terminate the initial jeopardy” surely did not account for a situation 
like Cabrera’s, where he was actually trying to uphold his conviction 
over the court’s voluntary vacation of it. 
The Cabrera court observed that just like when jeopardy attaches in a 
jury trial upon the impaneling of a jury and continues throughout the 
course of trial, so too should jeopardy continue throughout the course of 
a guilty plea hearing.110  The guilty plea hearing ended when Judge Holt 
accepted Cabrera’s guilty plea, that is, when Cabrera was convicted.  
Thus, despite the contention that jeopardy attaches upon the acceptance 
of a guilty plea, it should terminate there as well.  While the Cabrera 
court held that “[t]he sentence is a necessary part of a complete 
judgment of guilt,” and “[i]n the absence of a sentence, a judgment of 
conviction is not final,”111 sentencing adds nothing to the jeopardy a 
defendant faces at the moment of his conviction.  The Supreme Court in 
United States v. Ball indicated that a defendant is eligible for double 
jeopardy protection before an official judgment: “[A] verdict of 
acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”112  Cabrera was convicted 
upon the acceptance of his guilty plea, not upon his sentencing, which is 
perfectly logical because, as the Ball Court observed, “[t]he prohibition 
is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in 
jeopardy.”113  This suggests that once that risk is gone by actually 
coming to fruition via a conviction, the sentencing has no effect on the 
now-terminated jeopardy.  The Supreme Court has highlighted the fact 
that a sentence is not a requirement for a conviction to exist: “A plea of 
guilty . . . is itself a conviction . . . .  More is not required; the court has 
 
to conviction. 
Id. 
 110. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d  at 539. 
 111. Id. at 541. 
 112. 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896). 
 113. Id. at 669.  While the Supreme Court has indicated that one of the protections the Double 
Jeopardy Clause affords a defendant is the prohibition against multiple punishments, Ohio v. Johnson, 
467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984), the literal language of the text merely prohibits placing a defendant at risk of 
being convicted more than once.  Cabrera was exposed to the risk of being found guilty once, and was 
convicted.  He cannot be exposed to that risk again consistence with the Fifth Amendment. 
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nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”114  The mere separation 
of “conviction” and “sentence” suggests that the two are distinct 
concepts.115  Because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a 
defendant from being twice-exposed to the risk of conviction, rather 
than being twice-exposed to sentencing, the entry of judgment at the 
time of sentencing adds nothing to the jeopardy a defendant faces at 
the moment of his actual conviction, which in Cabrera was the 
moment Judge Holt unconditionally accepted Cabrera’s guilty plea. 
C. Interests Underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause 
As propounded by the Supreme Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was designed to prevent the State from making “repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”116  
Courts have frequently balanced these Fifth Amendment objectives of 
finality and repose for the defendant and the prevention of prosecutorial 
overreaching with the State’s interest in having one full and fair 
opportunity to convict.117  Not only were the goals of finality and repose 
for Cabrera not achieved, but the State fully enjoyed its interest in 
having one fair opportunity to convict him. 
The goals sought by the Double Jeopardy Clause were overlooked by 
the Cabrera court,118 and the reasoning illuminated by the circuits that 
hold otherwise is unpersuasive.  In finding no double jeopardy violation 
in the Judge Holt’s sua sponte vacation of a defendant’s guilty plea, the 
Illinois Appellate Court asserted, “[t]he mere acceptance of a guilty plea 
does not carry the same expectation of finality and tranquility that 
comes with a jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sentence as 
in Brown.”119  Neither the Cabrera court120 nor the First Circuit in 
 
 114. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). 
 115. Accord FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(A): “If the defendant pleaded not guilty and was convicted, 
after sentencing the court must advise the defendant of the right to appeal the conviction.”  It is 
elementary to conclude that since sentencing takes place after conviction, sentencing itself is not part of 
the conviction.  Accord Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar 
arises, after a conviction but before sentencing . . . .”); United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 
1983) (“The mere postponement of sentencing itself to a future date does not authorize the judge to 
remake or vacate the plea bargain for whatever reasons later seem appropriate to her.”). 
 116. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 117. Morris, 264 F.3d at 44. 
 118. People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010). 
 119. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 120. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d at 528. 
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Santiago Soto121 offered an explanation as to why the acceptance of a 
guilty plea differs from a jury verdict with respect to the sentiments of 
finality and tranquility.  Perhaps the Santiago Soto court was defending 
this assertion when it concluded that because the judge rejected the 
guilty plea immediately after he had accepted it, the defendant was not 
placed in jeopardy.122  Nowhere in the double jeopardy jurisprudence, 
however, has a court expressed the notion that some certain amount of 
time must elapse before the finality expectation sets in.  While this 
expectation is undoubtedly stronger after serving a full sentence, as was 
the case in Brown,123 that is not to say that the sentiment of finality is 
nonexistent where a defendant’s already-accepted guilty plea is vacated 
over his objections in the same proceeding.  Certainly Cabrera had some 
sense of finality and repose upon Judge Holt’s acceptance of his plea; 
his conviction was definite at that point and, although he still had to be 
officially sentenced, he must have felt some relief upon learning that he 
would not have to endure the anxiety and embarrassment that comes 
with a trial. 
This policy favoring a sense of finality also serves to avoid a 
defendant’s continual state of anxiety and insecurity because “one 
consequence of allowing the government to re-prosecute after a 
conviction would be to allow it to seek a higher sentence for the same 
conviction,”124 which is exactly what happened to Cabrera.  Thus, this 
sense of finality is the “reason that the entry of a finding of guilty 
pursuant to a defendant’s plea of guilty is a point beyond which a trial 
judge must turn a deaf ear to a defendant’s protestation of 
innocence . . . .”125  A key distinguishing factor between the defendant 
in Santiago Soto126 and Cabrera was that the former did not complain 
about the unsolicited vacation of his guilty plea, which suggests that he 
had no strong sentiment of finality in his conviction.  Conversely, 
Cabrera adamantly objected to Judge Holt’s actions, proving that he had 
already accepted his fate.  His repose, albeit brief, was thus being 
 
 121. 825 F.2d at 616. 
 122. Id.  At the risk of belaboring the point, the court there first misapplied the concept of 
jeopardy.  If anything, the court should have said that jeopardy had not terminated, but to say that the 
defendant was never placed in jeopardy ignores the literal meaning of the word.  The defendant had 
indeed been placed in jeopardy since he was already exposed to the risk of being found guilty. 
 123. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
 124. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1, at 1203 (5th ed. 2009). 
 125. Cabrera, 932 N.E. 2d at 540.  While the court exclaimed that there is no difference between 
a state practice that bars accepting guilty pleas and allowing a circuit court to accept or reject such pleas, 
it fails to account for a crucial fact: Judge Holt accepted Cabrera’s guilty plea!  Thus, the appellate case 
was not dealing with the validity of rejecting or accepting pleas; instead, it was faced with determining 
the constitutionality of vacating an already-accepted plea. 
 126. United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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stripped from him.  Interestingly, the Gilmore,127 Santiago-Soto,128 and 
Kim129 courts all dealt with unconditional acceptances of guilty pleas.  
Had any of the trial courts in these cases only conditionally accepted the 
pleas, the defendants would not have been able to assert any cognizable 
interests in finality since their factual guilt was being put on hold.130  
Moreover, unlike in Justices of Boston,131 Cabrera did not attempt to use 
the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent a second prosecution 
after initially appealing his conviction.  Rather, his finality interest was 
illustrated by the fact that he actually fought to stand on his guilty plea. 
The Gilmore court’s reasoning is equally unpersuasive and is 
arguably inapplicable to Cabrera’s situation.132  Basing its decision on 
the reasoning employed by the Johnson Court,133 the Third Circuit 
found nothing unconstitutional about vacating a guilty plea to a lesser 
included offense and instead convicting him of a greater offense.134  The 
court asserted, “the fact that his plea was stricken obviously puts him in 
no better position than that of a defendant whose plea remains intact,” 
and claimed that his prosecution would at most result in only one 
conviction.135  The Cabrera court encountered a much different 
situation, as there were no charges pending when it accepted the 
defendant’s guilty plea.136  Thus, not only was the finality interest much 
weaker in Gilmore,137 but the State there had not yet fully and fairly 
completed its prosecution.  While the stricken plea in Gilmore did not 
put the defendant in a better position than a defendant whose plea 
remained intact (since the other charges were still pending),138 Cabrera 
 
 127. Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
 128. 825 F.2d at 616. 
 129. United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 130. In Gilmore, 793 F.2d at 564, the trial judge told the defendant that he was not bound by the 
plea agreement.  While that was correct, he said this before actually accepting the guilty plea.  Post-
acceptance, the finality expectation had set in, and the court should not have been authorized to vacate 
the plea.  As stated by LaFave: 
The easiest cases are those in which the government and the defendant have entered into 
an agreement that a greater charge will be dismissed in exchange for the defendant’s plea 
to a lesser charge.  In this situation, once the court has accepted unconditionally the plea 
agreement and the defendant’s guilty plea, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits 
proceeding with the greater charge. 
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 124, at 1209. 
 131. 466 U.S. 294 (1984). 
 132. 793 F.2d at 564. 
 133. 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
 134. Gilmore, 793 F.2d at 569–70. 
 135. Id. at 570. 
 136. People v. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. App. Ct., 2010).  The other charges had been nol-
prossed.  Id. at 532. 
 137. Gilmore, 793 F.2d at 564. 
 138. Id. at 570. 
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was much worse off after having his plea vacated and would ultimately 
enjoy none of the interests sought to be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.  Additionally, the second prosecution of Cabrera would 
result in two convictions since he was first convicted when Judge Holt 
accepted his guilty plea.139 
Even assuming that no finality interests would have been implicated 
by vacating Cabrera’s guilty plea over his objections, the circuits finding 
such an act constitutional fail to account for the other interests sought to 
be protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Cabrera had to endure the 
expense, embarrassment, and ordeal of a trial despite the fact that he 
specifically tried to avoid all of the above by pleading guilty.  He 
undoubtedly lived in a state of anxiety and insecurity from the time of 
Judge Holt’s vacation of his plea throughout the course of the bench 
trial.  Perhaps the most important consideration underlying the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the Fifth Amendment was intended to curb the 
enhanced possibility that, even though innocent, a defendant may be 
found guilty with repeated attempts by the State to convict him.140  
Although a trial court may constitutionally reject a guilty plea from a 
defendant who simultaneously professes his innocence,141 and while 
much has been written about the inequity of the plea bargaining process 
even for innocent defendants,142 it seems paradoxical to assert that there 
is no factual basis for a guilty plea while simultaneously convicting a 
defendant of the charge to which he attempted to plead guilty.  Even 
more absurd was the fact that Judge Holt convicted Cabrera after 
previously telling him, “I’m not going to send you to the penitentiary for 
a crime you didn’t commit.”143  Despite Cabrera’s professed innocence, 
he thought it was in his best interest to plead guilty based on his prior 
criminal record, and for good reason.144  If Cabrera was actually 
innocent, not only did he feel forced to take a plea because the perceived 
 
 139. See supra Part II(A). 
 140. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). 
 141. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 142. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent 
Defendants who Plead Guilty (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103787; John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady 
and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983). 
 143. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d at 533. 
 144. Id.  That many innocent people are incarcerated is undisputed.  For example, there have been 
over three-hundred post-conviction DNA exonerations alone in the United States in the past two 
decades, and that number is growing as the so called “innocence problem” is slowly being recognized.  
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last 
visited May 24, 2013). 
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(and perhaps real) inequity in the criminal justice system,145 but he was 
subjected to two attempts by the State to convict him of something that 
he may not have done.  The Cabrera court completely ignored the 
interest expounded by the Supreme Court in Green146 in preventing the 
increased possibility of convicting an innocent defendant when it failed 
to even discuss the possibility that the defendant was convicted not 
once, but twice, for a crime that he maintains he did not commit. 
Notwithstanding the finality implications that may or may not have 
been present in each case discussed in this Note, these other interests 
mentioned above were never even addressed by the courts.  The interests 
sought to be protected are not an elements-based test whereby if one of 
them is lacking, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated.  The 
circuits finding no constitutional violation, however, seem to treat them 
that way.  Even so, the one goal to be balanced against these pro-
defendant interests was not implicated: that the State in Cabrera had one 
full and fair opportunity to convict is evidenced by the fact that the 
prosecution agreed to the guilty plea before the guilty plea hearing.  
Unlike in Johnson,147 where the defendant offered only to resolve part 
of the charges against him while the State objected to disposing of any 
of the other counts, in Cabrera the State of Illinois agreed to nol-pros 
the other counts and prosecute him solely on one charge.148  The 
prosecution thus not only reached an agreement with Cabrera, but come 
time for the guilty plea hearing, it did nothing to assert that the plea did 
not fully satisfy its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict him. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like many defendants in similar predicaments, Cabrera made the 
calculated choice to plead guilty yet maintain his innocence at the same 
time.  It is uncontestable that a district court may refuse to accept such a 
plea,149 but once it accepts the plea, the defendant has been convicted.  
A court’s ensuing sua sponte vacation of the plea violates a defendant’s 
constitutional protection against “being twice put in jeopardy,” for such 
an act ignores Supreme Court precedent, offends the language of the 
Fifth Amendment,150 and runs counter to the principles underling the 
 
 145. See generally, Paul Butler, Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions: Affirmative Action and 
the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841 (1997). 
 146. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). 
 147. 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
 148. Cabrera, 932 N.E.2d at 533.  Interestingly, the Santiago Soto court faced the opposite 
situation: the State objected to the government’s vacation of the plea, while the defendant was 
apparently fine with it.  825 F.2d at 617. 
 149. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38. 
 150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Double Jeopardy Clause. 
A simple illustration of the transitive property proves that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is violated in such an instance: the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
following conviction;151 a guilty plea is a conviction;152 thus, the Clause 
is violated by vacating a defendant’s guilty plea and forcing him to stand 
trial a second time on the same charge.  Courts have evaded such a 
finding by encumbering themselves in a discussion regarding the 
attachment of jeopardy and a morass of conflicting jurisprudence 
regarding the termination of it.  The oft-cited analogy between a guilty 
plea hearing and a trial can be helpful in clarifying this area of the law.  
Because the word “jeopardy” denotes “exposure to risk,” it is 
nonsensical to hold that jeopardy attaches once the court has accepted a 
guilty plea since it is at that moment that the defendant is actually 
convicted, thus transforming any risk of conviction into the finality of it.  
Thus, jeopardy should attach at the inception of the guilty plea hearing, 
just as it attaches upon the impaneling of a jury in a jury trial or the 
calling of the first witness in a bench trial.  Likewise, just like jeopardy 
terminates in a trial upon the jury’s verdict, so too should jeopardy 
terminate in a guilty plea hearing upon the judge’s acceptance of the 
guilty plea.  In holding that “more is not required” after a conviction but 
to “give judgment and sentence,” the Supreme Court has implicitly 
noted that a sentence is distinct from a conviction and thus the former 
has no double jeopardy consequences.153 
The principles underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause additionally 
illustrate the unconstitutionality of a district court’s sua sponte vacation 
of a defendant’s guilty plea.  The feelings of repose and finality for a 
defendant are no less implicated by a court’s acceptance of his guilty 
plea than they are by the rendering of a verdict by the jury, and courts 
that hold otherwise offer no explanation for such an assertion.  Cabrera 
was perhaps the victim of the greatest injustice the Double Jeopardy 
Clause was meant to prevent: being convicted twice of a crime that he 
may have not committed.  Another discussion for another time, the fact 
that Judge Holt professed Cabrera’s innocence when he vacated the 
latter’s guilty plea, but then personally found him guilty at the ensuing 
bench trial, is startling, and it serves as a caution that the double 
jeopardy jurisprudence needs some refining.  As for Cabrera, the case 
should have been an easy one.  By simply harkening to former Supreme 
Court precedent, the mere language of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and 
the driving principles of the Fifth Amendment, courts should reach the 
 
 151. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498. 
 152. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). 
 153. Id. 
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conclusion that the sua sponte vacation of a defendant’s guilty plea and 
subsequent mandate of trial violates his protection against “being twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”154 
 
 154. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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